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FOREWORD
Many cities are growing into “mega” land areas
filled with complex terrain and populations where the
U.S. military will undoubtedly have to engage. Often,
states fail to provide basic services to some territories,
leaving inhabitants disenfranchised. These gaps are
then filled by social entrepreneurs, often ethnic or religious-based civil society groups—or even organized
crime syndicates—who effectively identify niche
needs in the marketplace and fill them more effectively than other competitors, including traditional state
authorities. Leaders of these groups maintain control
through various means, including: violence, coercion,
and service provision; or through tribal, religious, or
other cultural ties and structures.
In order to understand and predict the emergence
of alternative governance, and to identify whether it
represents a threat or opportunity to U.S. interests, we
must develop a toolkit, which can be based on existing
sources and analytic methods that only need to be expanded to the city level or weighted and appropriately applied. Such foreknowledge is a force multiplier
for planning and operating in an urban environment,
particularly one as dense as a megacity.
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SUMMARY
Many cities are growing into “mega” land areas
filled with complex terrain and populations where the
U.S. military will undoubtedly have to engage. States
often fail to provide basic services to some territories,
leaving inhabitants disenfranchised. These gaps are
then filled by social entrepreneurs, often ethnic or religious-based civil society groups—or even organized
crime syndicates—who effectively identify niche
needs in the marketplace and fill them more effectively than other competitors, including traditional state
authorities. Leaders of these groups maintain control
through various means, including: violence, coercion,
and service provision; or through tribal, religious, or
other cultural ties and structures.
As the 21st century progresses, the role and structure of government is already evolving from the current Westphalian, nation-state-based system originating in the 17th century to one more loosely based on
alternative governance structures (AGS), the form
and function of which we are only beginning to understand. This phenomenon is easy to imagine in fragile states; however, as industrialized nations become
increasingly polarized by economic inequality; as
citizens’ trust in the effectiveness and motives of state
authorities erodes; and as social media tools help AGS
organize and operate, they are also likely to become
a greater threat to state authority in the developed
world.
While examining AGS types, not all have a violent or profit-seeking structure. There are also civil
society and faith-based organizations providing services that are the traditional responsibility of states,
which can also (wittingly or otherwise) undermine
its authority peacefully. This is why it is important to
xiii

focus on the structures that emerge, as opposed to the
individual groups themselves, to enable identification
of the varying types of alternative governance arising
in these immense urban areas before conflict or other
circumstances erupt that the United States considers
to be against its national interest.
If the state is unable to predict the emergence of
such alternatives to its own influence, and always assumes that it must challenge and eradicate them, the
result will be numerous small-scale violent conflicts
that undermine regional and global stability and endanger energy, food, and human security. Unless
states can understand the factors causing these structures to emerge and threaten their authority, they
will be unprepared to determine whether it is in their
interest to halt the development of these alternative
governance models, or to share this market with nongovernmental or sub-state actors in order to actually
maintain or enhance the state’s own legitimacy.
Within existing or emerging AGS, identifying
norm-based governance factors such as reputation,
trust, reciprocity, enforcement of compliance, and
self-regulation can be keys to the effective communication of tactical or operational goals. In addition,
the introduction of respected figures that will assist
in attaining goals that are of U.S. interest is a critical
method of undermining coercive or other leadership
whose objectives run counter to U.S. interests.
It can be difficult for outsiders to understand the
complex social networks, incentives, and motivations
that underlie AGS, making it nearly impossible to determine with whom to negotiate and what leverage
might be effective to further U.S. goals. In addition,
the amount and type of power that members or leaders of such structures wield in actuality, as opposed to

xiv

assurances, is critical to gauge—especially in a climate
of shifting alliances. Planning and movement are also
inhibited by the poor mapping, weak infrastructure,
and the disordered slums of megacities, all of which
can be nearly impossible to monitor or access.
In order to understand and predict the emergence
of alternative governance, and to identify whether it
represents a threat or opportunity to U.S. interests, we
must develop a toolkit, which can be based on existing
sources and analytic methods that only need to be expanded to the city level or weighted and appropriately applied. Such foreknowledge is a force multiplier
and an important nonlethal weapon for planning and
operating in an urban environment, particularly one
as dense as a megacity.
In addition to social network analysis methods,
cultural features, such as shared dialect or language
and a history of opposition to state control or of intergroup conflict, are important factors for understanding the development of AGS. More specifically, with
enhanced sample sizes and updated information,
measurable cultural factors can be attributed to residents of targeted megacities. These include Geert Hofstede’s concepts of power distance, individualism vs.
collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance.
In looking at trends in urbanization, the focus is
on governance and the factors directly related to it
from the average citizen’s perspective; in its most basic form, this includes providing security, economic
opportunity, and other basic services. To this end, a
number of existing indices can be applied to provide
a picture of megacities of increasing importance to
U.S. defense planning, including Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, certain elements of the U.S. Institute for Peace’s Fragile States
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Index, the Legatum Institute’s Prosperity Index, and
the United Nations (UN) Habitat Program’s Cities
Prosperity Index.
These measures, along with cultural dimensions
and basic demographic, political, and economic data,
added to critical field-based human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, can provide a set of very basic indicators for piecing together the contextual environment
in which the selected megacities exist, as well as their
own prosperity and growth projections. Such an expandable toolbox would be invaluable for U.S. Army
planners to provide a starting point for developing
critical pre-knowledge of these locales and what is
governing them.

xvi

ALTERNATIVE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN
MEGACITIES: THREATS OR OPPORTUNITIES?
Megacities are growing, they are becoming more connected, and the ability of host nation governments to
effectively deal with their explosive growth and maintain security is, in many cases, diminishing. Megacities are a unique environment that the U.S. Army does
not fully understand.1

INTRODUCTION
Steven Pinker reminded us in his 2011 book, The
Better Angels of our Nature, that: “feuding among
knights and peasants was not just a nuisance but a lost
opportunity,” eventually turning, “Warriors to courtiers.”2 The concept of modern-day “warlords” controlling urban territory, and from whom the United
States with all its might could not wrest control, came
into the American consciousness with a jolt in 1993
Somalia. The videos of Third World thugs attacking a
modern multinational force trying to provide humanitarian assistance was a shock that Americans of that
generation will not forget.
Monikers such as “warlords,” “brigands,” and
“insurgents” connote our distaste for non-traditional
power structures in far-flung cities that we believe
should all be run by Rotarian-like mayors and city
councils. The state of the world today belies this false
sense of what constitutes “governing.” Urban planners
suggest that effective governing means providing the
basic goods and services people need to live “normal”
lives, such as clean water, food, shelter, and security.
In many places, cities are growing into massive land
areas filled with enormous slums where vast numbers
of people are not receiving these basic goods and ser1

vices from their central government, if at all. In portions of these “megacities,” services are not provided
by traditional means, but by gangs or others who are
essentially effective social entrepreneurs, identifying
niche needs in the marketplace and filling them more
effectively than other potential competitors, including traditional state authorities. These leaders control
specific territories or populations by various means,
including: violence, coercion, and service provision;
or through tribal, religious, or other cultural ties and
structures.
The impact of such cultural networks cannot be
discounted in the role played by alternative governance structures (AGS) in megacities. In his 2013 book,
Revenge of Geography, Robert Kaplan argues:
It is the very impersonal quality of urban life, which
is lived among strangers, that accounts for intensified
religious [or other deep personal identifying] feeling.
For in the village of old, religion was a natural extension of the daily traditions and routine of life among
the extended family; but migrations to the city brought
Arab Muslims into the anonymity of slum existence,
and to keep the family together and the young from
drifting into crime, religion has had to be reinvented
in starker, more ideological form. In this way, states
weaken, or at least have to yield somewhat, to new
and sometimes extreme kinds of nationalism and religiosity advanced by urbanization.3

This phenomenon could also easily be seen among
other immigrant populations in any megacity, such as
the clichéd ubiquity of Italian and Irish adherence to
Catholicism across New York City, since large waves
of both groups began coming to the United States and
continuing today in many communities across the
country. This reinforcement of identity enabled pae2

sani, or Italians of a shared regional group in Italy, to
eventually grow influence networks into larger economic units of Italians, rather than only segmented
Sicilians, Napolitanos, or Calabrese, who initially
fought turf wars against each other in American cities.
As the 21st century progresses, the role and structure of government is already evolving from the current Westphalian, nation-state-based system originating in the 17th century to one more loosely based on
AGS, the form and function of which are only beginning to be understood.
As Francis Fukuyama, Phil Williams, and many
others have argued, traditional governance structures are under siege. Jennifer Keister argues that
misnamed:
‘ungoverned spaces’ exist and persist because the
costs of incorporating them are too high, and the benefits of integrating them (and the risks of not doing so)
are too low.4

Keister adds:
Contrary to their popular characterizations, political
order in these areas has not disappeared: it is simply
wielded by actors other than the state, such as traditional or religious elites, warlords, community groups,
and rebel organizations.5

As Williams noted in his 2008 Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph, “the sooner we understand
what may attempt to replace them [AGS], the better
we will be able to mitigate negative effects on stability
and security.”6
This evolution will be more rapid and widespread
in developing areas where people are “living on the
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edge,” disenfranchised or beyond the reach of centralized government control and influence. However, as
industrialized nations become increasingly polarized
by economic inequality; as citizens’ trust in the effectiveness and motives of state authorities erodes; and
as social media tools help AGS organize and operate,
this phenomenon is also likely to become a greater
threat to state authority in the developed world.
If the state is unable to predict the emergence of
such alternatives to its own influence, and always assumes that it must challenge and eradicate them, the
result will be numerous small-scale violent conflicts
that undermine regional and global stability, and
endanger energy, food, and human security. Unless
states can understand the factors causing these structures to emerge and threaten the state’s authority, they
will be unprepared to determine whether it is in their
interest to halt the development of these alternative
governance models or to share this market with nongovernmental or sub-state actors in order to actually
maintain or enhance the state’s own legitimacy.
Identifying and defining the types of nontraditional governance structures, and understanding
how, where, and why they emerge, can reduce future
conflict and increase stability by signaling whether a
state should challenge, cooperate with, or co-opt these
structures as a means of enhancing the state’s reach,
effectiveness, and legitimacy. This knowledge is critical to mission success in locales that U.S. and allied
land forces may need to be deployed to over the next
20 years and can serve as a strategic multiplier for the
U.S. military and its policy planners by:
• Increasing the understanding of emerging areas of potential urban instability and conflict;
• Assisting defense budgetary analysis, resource
allocation, and force planning;
4

• Facilitating conflict mitigation before violence
erupts, thereby avoiding costly expenditures of
both blood and treasure;
• Identifying true social, political, and economic
centers of gravity among foreign populations
before forces are committed to deploy in order
to determine appropriate measures of mission
success.

GOVERNANCE: A MATTER OF TRUST
When people do not trust the state, the door is
opened for an AGS to set up operations. A review of
current literature on governance and legitimacy suggests the primary common factor that ensures popular
support of authority in a given geographic location is
trust. This does not mean agreement with the methods
of governing, but involves a belief in the consistent
application of laws or expressed social mores across
the territory (i.e., “truth, justice, and the American
Way”).
This trust can be earned through the effective provision of needed services, such as security; logistics
to obtain and distribute adequate food, water, and
other critical goods; dispute mediation, healthcare,
and other social services; or it can be earned through
consistent application of violence or other coercive
measures. This concept of trust is not equivalent to
Western notions of “good” governance, only an assurance that the population can plan and organize itself
and its activities in a clear and predictable manner,
even under threat of violence, as long as there is some
consistency in its application.
It is critical to identify the specific sources of
trust that impart legitimacy on AGS and their leaders, whether benevolent, coercive, or something in
5

between, in order to understand how to co-opt, support, or undermine that trust to enhance mission success once defined. Conflict is more likely to arise when
the population does not have this sense of trust, and
when “laws” or social norms and mores serving in that
capacity are not applied consistently resulting in chaos and uncertainty. Conflict is, of course, more likely
in times of transition, whether due to economic, political, or social change; or due to natural or manmade
disasters. This is the case even under more effective or
benevolent governance structures, as the population
is unsettled and unable to conduct its daily affairs in
an atmosphere of certainty.
Examples of unexpected governance structures effectively creating a sense of trust abound. This would
include the coercive government of Tito’s Yugoslavia,
until the fall of the Soviet Union triggered an economic
disruption that ended the relative economic prosperity and peaceful cohabitation of nearly a dozen ethnic
groups and resulted in chaos and dissolution with
well-documented catastrophic results.
Aside from such state examples, unexpected
governance structures also appeared in the housing
projects of Chicago, a few blocks from the esteemed
university. Sudhir Venkatesh vividly describes in his
2008 book, Gang Leader for a Day, how a Black Kings
midlevel gang leader effectively governed a society
apart from and forgotten by the city surrounding it,
ensuring relative stability, security, and economic
benefits for the poor residents of a slum slated for demolition. Pinker notes that such structures arise due
to: “Mistrust of the criminal justice system turned into
cynicism and sometimes paranoia, making self-help
justice seem the only alternative.”7
The Taliban even initially gave parts of southern
Afghanistan a break from the chaos of the civil war
6

resulting from three primary “warlords” vying for
dominance for 2 decades. As a junior researcher at the
Brookings Institution in 1994, amid the outcry against
the Taliban’s brutality as it roared across Afghanistan,
the author recalls a small article in the The Washington
Post noting that the vanguard of warriors were soon
followed by convoys of trucks bearing food and other
goods that people had in short supply, and thinking:
“These guys are brilliant and they will be hard to get
rid of.”
Some observers have argued that the mistake the
United Nations (UN) made in Somalia was in not
engaging the local “warlords” in the process of distributing aid, thus recognizing that they were more
legitimate sources of power and influence in areas of
Mogadishu than the central government that had fallen 2 years earlier. Others have suggested that geography precludes some locales from being effectively
governed by a central authority, and that a clan structure or chains of linked commercial centers are able to
provide services and stability for larger numbers of
citizens.
Understanding how AGS arise, operate, and can
be co-opted or co-operated with—not just prevented
and eradicated—will be an important part of strategic
planning for dealing with growing threats in urban
areas in the developing world, just as some U.S. cities
try to do at a lower-level with community-led policing
and jobs programs.
There are common characteristics shared by AGS
that successfully challenge state authority, such as the
services they provide, their structures, their modes of
communication (including propaganda and messaging), and their relationships with residents.
Like corporations and other organizations, criminal gangs typically have a four-level hierarchical
7

structure. The youngest, newest, and strongest members act as the armed front on the streets, whether they
are directly selling drugs, collecting extortion money,
or fighting armed battles for turf or other objectives.
The next level is the middle managers—as in a corporation, the business end of the entity—who lead and
organize the first level in daily and tactical matters.
The third level is the decision-making circle, normally
a council of those who have been with the group for a
longer period and have risen through the ranks. These
members oversee operational functions and assist the
top echelon leader or leaders in developing strategies
and making other significant decisions.
Like any business, the managers and third-tier “advisory board” meet on a regular basis in a pre-ordained
place to plan and share information. Black Kings manager, “J.T.,” surprised researcher Venkhatesh when
he invited Venkhatesh to the daily “staff meeting”
conducted in a Chicago diner at 7:30 each morning.8
The specific activities of such groups on a daily and
longer-term basis, as well as the amount of freedom to
work independently or be innovative, depends upon
the group’s alignment and objectives, (whether profitbased or ideological), and the leadership style at the
higher levels.
A critical difference in identifying alternative governance types is to determine whether the structure
is primarily in place for capitalist profit-motivated
purposes or to meet ideological goals. It is generally
easier to define engagement strategies with leaders of
profit-motivated AGS, who are pragmatic and forward
thinking in terms of expanding profitable opportunities and limiting risks, than with fanatical ideologues
who are far more focused on radically altering the current status quo instead of building a stable future for
adherents.
8

Provision of Services.
Aside from ensuring the availability of sufficient
resources and maintaining critical trade relationships
and routes, the primary service guaranteed by a stable
state is security. If citizens do not perceive that the
state function responsible is adequately providing
this key service, whether it be the military in terms
of national security or municipal policing, alternative
groups will fill the vacuum and ensure that security
is restored, but perhaps not in a way the state would
prefer. At the municipal level, such structures can take
the form of neighborhood watch groups, which range
from a network of alert citizens to collectively hiring
private security, to armed citizens actively patrolling
and often behaving as vigilantes.
In May 2014, on the highways surrounding Moscow, gunmen called the Grand Theft Auto (GTA)
Gang started putting spikes on desolate stretches of
roadway; when drivers stopped to check the damage
to their cars, they were shot dead without even being
robbed. Despite joint efforts of local police and even
the Federal Security Service, in September 2014, after
14 people had been killed in this way, a drag racing
group called “Smotra” began a vigilante crusade to
stop these killings and make Moscow’s highways once
again safe for drivers. Smotra representatives spoke of
participating in this dangerous mission for their family and the country, larger ideologies than revenge or
simple security.
These vigilantes wore body armor, drove expensive sports cars, and about 1 in 10 was licensed to
carry a firearm. They used their sports cars as bait
and patrolled these areas; but then they began to stop
motorists and search cars, interrogating and frighten9

ing drivers about the dangers on the roads, which disconcerted some residents who might otherwise have
appreciated the group’s efforts.9
This is an example of a group that formed (like that
of a “posse” in the Wild West of the United States) for
a specific purpose: to catch a criminal or group of outlaws, and typically disband once the target or threat
was eliminated. Before the appearance of GTA, Smotra
was a group of fast car aficionados, who likely disturbed the peace with their activities, but were not a
criminal gang organized for profit or intent on becoming an alternative to state governance. Unless some
motive becomes more attractive to Smotra leaders,
profit for example, the group is likely to retire from
vigilantism and go back to scaring motorists with their
fast driving alone once this threat has passed.
However, the majority of gangs in Moscow are
ethnically-based, either Russian neo-Nazis or Central
Asian or Southern Russian Muslim groups, such as
Chechens. These groups have historical animosity toward the state. They feel alienated on the one hand by
intolerant immigration policies, and on the other by
disenfranchisement by the Russian population and a
legal and economic system that displays bias against
them. In 2014, Russian investigators identified 883
ethnic gangs across the country, mainly comprised
of small groups of legal immigrants, who perpetrate
muggings and small-scale violent acts.10
Chief of Moscow police criminal investigative division Major General Igor Zinoviev noted in
November 2014 that:
The so-called complex of a mercenary operating on
a foreign ground is characteristic of them: they have
no moral limitations, and elders or clerics whom they
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traditionally listen to in their home countries and who
can help reach out to them are not around.11

This phenomenon of social limiters on the behavior of young men is well presented by William Reno in
his chapter in Ungoverned Spaces regarding challenges
for al-Qaeda recruitment in Somalia:
As young supporters arrived from other parts of the
country, they shed the social strictures that governed
their behavior in their home communities. . . . [t]hus
young men . . . would be more willing to use violence
on behalf of their patrons with assurance they would
not suffer the usual social consequences.12

In the case of megacities, many young people moving
to cities, ostensibly to find economic opportunities to
support their families and home communities, can be
drawn into criminal, ideological, or other forms of AGS
as they find themselves in a new environment with
lessened family and community involvement, even if
they share their new urban space with members of their
ethnic group or clan. Absent the imposition of traditional community mores, these “displaced” urbanites
can become highly effective AGS members subverting
state authority, as they are more willing to commit
acts that would be negatively perceived or prohibited
by religious or other moral codes enforced more easily by local religious or family leaders in the home
community.
In order for the U.S. military to effectively operate as needed in megacities, these structures must be
understood in terms of: the source of trust; the level
and type of services they provide; and the networks
among them, in order to plan and seek allies and opportunities for cooperation with or the undermining
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of one group by supporting another. However, as was
done in order to counter the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan in the 1980s, support of the mujahidin (holy
warriors of God) engendered a greater threat for the
future. Longer-term studies of such structures and
longer-term post-conflict relationship-building activities are required as AGS goals and opportunities
change.
Trust and Culture.
Within existing or emerging AGS, identifying
norm-based governance factors such as reputation,
trust, reciprocity, enforcement of compliance, and
self-regulation can be keys to the effective communication of tactical or operational goals. In addition,
the introduction of respected figures that will assist
in attaining goals that are of U.S. interest is a critical
method of undermining coercive or other leadership
styles whose objectives run counter to U.S. interests.
It can be difficult for outsiders to understand the
complex social networks, incentives, and motivations
that underlie AGS, making it nearly impossible to determine with whom to negotiate and what leverage
might be effective to further U.S. goals. In addition,
the amount and type of power that members or leaders of such structures wield in actuality, as opposed to
assurances, is critical to gauge—especially in a climate
of shifting alliances. Planning and movement are also
inhibited by the poor mapping, weak infrastructure,
and disordered slums of megacities, all of which can
be nearly impossible to monitor or access.13

12

Community Attitudes.
Community attitudes toward crime, fault, punishment, and justice also affect the creation and maintenance of AGS. Identifying how a given AGS runs
counter to these attitudes can provide an opening to
undermining or gradually changing how these structures evolve. Typically, AGS arise in times of transition, when uncertainty and instability are increasing.
Even coercive AGS can provide a sense of security and
normalcy that most residents prefer over chaos.
In many places, as political “progress” takes place
in directions seen as positive in the West, new laws
may run counter to long-held mores, such as loyalty
to one’s ethnic group or tribe, family, religion, or
region. This sense of obligation can cause persons in
both the public and the private sectors to go against
the law without concern or an internal sense of
operating unethically.14
Expression of Shared Values: Method and Messaging.
Even now in a time of advanced telecommunications, with Islamic terrorist groups effectively using
social media to communicate and recruit members
with increasingly sophisticated messaging and videography, all forms of AGS communication must be
understood. As the pony express and the telegraph
made their way across the newly colonized western
United States, Native Americans continued to thwart
modern communication methods with traditional
smoke signals and drum beats.
By the same token, post-9/11, the United States
was highly successful in disrupting significant financial networks involving witting or unwitting Islamic
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charities funding terrorist activities. However, more
difficult to track cash transactions, hawala (transfer)
trust networks, or chains of bartered services must be
taken into account when defining AGS activities and
methods of financial transaction for U.S. entities to attempt to disrupt or insinuate themselves into them for
operational or strategic purposes.
Aside from identifying communication networks
within AGS in megacities, the content of the messaging is crucial to understand. Current effective terrorist propaganda has become far more sophisticated
than the proletariat slogans and icons that now seem
laughable in the Soviet period. On a special segment
of CNN’s Global Public Square on the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) that aired in July 2015, host
Fareed Zakaria noted:
a lot of the propaganda mixes the violence with scenes
of camaraderie, friendship. The people in ISIS [sic]
videos seem to be saying, ‘We did not belong where
we were but now we have found a home,’ a powerful
message to the millions of unemployed, disconnected,
young Muslims across the Middle East and even in
countries like France and Germany.15

Appearing on the same episode, Jürgen Todenhöfer, a German journalist who spent time in ISILcontrolled Mosul reported:
The amazing thing is that they [ISIL recruits] are completely enthusiastic. They think it’s the time of their
life. They think that they are part of a historical event
changing the whole Middle East. . . . There are even recruitment videos for deaf jihadists who wish to join.16
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Dimensions of Culture as a Predictive Model.
Cultural features, such as shared dialect or language, or a history of opposition to state control or
of inter-group conflict, are important factors contributing to the creation and maintenance of AGS. More
specifically, with enhanced sample sizes and updated
information, measurable cultural factors can be attributed to residents of targeted megacities, such as those
developed by Geert Hofstede, including power distance, individualism vs. collectivism, and uncertainty
avoidance. Figure 1 below compares three of Hofstede’s Dimensions of National Culture in four widely
divergent countries containing megacities to be explored further: the United States (New York City) as
a baseline only, Russia (Moscow), Pakistan (Karachi),
and Nigeria (Lagos).

Figure 1. Comparison of Hofsteade’s
Dimension of National Culture.
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Power Distance: According to Hofstede, power
distance refers to “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within
a country expect and accept that power is distributed
unequally.”17 High power-distance countries tend to
operate within a vassal system, such as that prevalent
in Medieval Europe in which subordinates are dependent for protection or economic or political gain from
superiors.18
In such cases, favors are exchanged for loyalty, a
process that can continue for generations in a paternalistic bond difficult to quantify from the outside but
fully understood by the participants. Such a system
engenders corruption from a Western perspective
that actually provides a level of stability and certainty
until some transitional period when the strength of
the superior is diminished or the subordinate has the
opportunity and motive to subvert the system.
Such transition can take place suddenly due to a
reversal of fortune resulting from a catastrophic event
or through a gradual, strategic process as took place
in Europe at the creation of the Westphalian State.
Knights marauding across the countryside, like modern-day “warlords” or today’s battles for drug turf,
were economically detrimental to increasingly powerful European kings as villages were destroyed, arable land burned, and peasants killed, thus reducing
the given region’s overall productivity and economic
return.
The trick was to entice or coerce a knight to defer
the right to use violence toward the state, for a larger
“national” defense was difficult because it could appear weak to other knights or lesser nobles. This required the state to be vigilant in administering violence in a measured and consistent capacity in order
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to keep peace and discourage a resumption of revenge
killings and attacks for plunder. The head of state had
to ensure that his power was sufficient, to ensure that
currying his favor was more attractive than subverting it. Pinker calls this process of creating the “Leviathan,” the turning of “warriors into courtiers,” one of
the most significant developments in the stabilizing
and civilizing process.19 If the state is unable to maintain this appearance of supreme power, members of
high-power distance cultures can dissolve into AGS
based on paternalism.
High-power distance cultures can also tolerate far
greater degrees of inequality than lower-power distance cultures, so unfair distribution of economic opportunity is considered a fact of life and not imperative to strive to overcome for oneself or for the greater
good.
As illustrated in Figure 1, if we apply this cultural
dimension to four megacity host countries, it is clear
that as the United States has low power distance at 40,
it is not surprising that rising inequality has become a
significant political issue that the populace feels empowered to act to reverse. Pakistan has a relatively
neutral power distance level at 55, which Hofstede
suggests is inconclusive. Nigeria is much higher at
80, suggesting that people in that country tend to expect a lot from the state in terms of services and subsidies, and they are likely to turn to other sources of
governance in their absence. Russia demonstrates a
very high power distance level at 93, which is not surprising considering the centuries-long imperial serf
system that eventually reinvented itself as the Communist Party hierarchy and others, indicating democratization will likely take a long time and will need a
different sort of ruling class to emerge in Russia. While
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a severe economic disruption always has the chance
of creating conflict, cultures with high power distance
are also likely to be more tolerant of poor national economic performance that affects the lower classes.
Individualism vs. Collectivism: This cultural factor relates to the extent to which an individual expects
life decisions and directions to be determined by the
individual himself or the group to which he belongs;
whether that is defined as the family, nuclear or far extended; friends or peers; or religious or ethnic groups.
Expecting democratic values and individual choice
to be primary in collectivist cultures is a nonstarter
for peacekeeping and civil society. Coercive AGS
can be highly effective in collectivist cultures such as
Pakistan, which ties with China for a score of 14 (not
shown), as group harmony is seen as more important
than individual rights, even when maintaining the
peace can cause great harm to a significant number
of individuals. This was evident when Chinese civil
society groups attempted to co-opt power from the
Chinese state in the 1980s, resulting in the events at
Tiananmen Square in 1989. From the perspective of an
American college student in China at the time, CIA
Analyst Dr. Rob Johnston recalls:
It seemed inconceivable that the citizens of Beijing—10-12 million people—would not intervene on
behalf of the students. That many people could have
overwhelmed the PLA [Peoples’ Liberation Army] had
they chosen to do so. I also assumed that the soldiers
of the PLA would be reluctant to fire on their own people, partly because the majority of both groups were
from the same, dominant ethnic group of China, the
Han, and, in part, because the soldiers represented a
lower rung of Chinese society then did the students
. . . I was wrong.20
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In hindsight, Johnston recognized that:
In China, the protesting students were seen as a direct
challenge to political authority and . . . their actions
were viewed as an outright conflict between the future
elite and the current leadership. The protest itself was
viewed as a violation of a taboo, upsetting the cultural
order and the stability of society.21

This view is borne out with China’s low individualist
score of 20 (not shown), which is not surprising given
the historical emphasis placed on the harmony of the
group, as illustrated by Dr. Johnston’s experience in
1989.
The United States defines itself as a country of
“rugged individuals,” so a high score of 93 is not surprising, but Russia shares the same score, despite the
high power distance and its collectivist political history. Pakistan’s highly collectivist score of 14 indicates
that loyalty to the group (whether it is the family, or
an ethnic or religious group) trumps merit, which affects everything from commercial and employment
practices to political elections, leading to a high tolerance of Western-defined corruption easily manifesting
itself in the official and unofficial governance structures in a megacity like Karachi. Nigeria is a bit more
individualistic than Pakistan, but is still far more collectivist than the United States or Russia with a score
of 30, again contributing to a “tribal” political climate
and widespread corruption.
Uncertainty Avoidance: This cultural factor reflects intolerance for ambiguity within a given culture, often leading to strong traditional beliefs and
adherence to rules in order to attempt to control daily
consistency for familiar outcomes, even if the rules are
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actually detrimental to the individual’s progress and
well-being. In such cultures, Western perceptions of
corrupt systems, even at the state level, can be viewed
as a mechanism to reduce uncertainty. In situations
where outcomes are uncertain, corruption may serve
to secure a more certain result. For example, M.S. Alam
describes how government officials in passport offices
in uncertainty avoidant cultures “create the potential
for illicit gains by causing delays and uncertainty in the
processing of applications.”22 Salim Rashid observed
that providing an appropriate bribe while contracting
for utility services reduces uncertainty and increases
efficiency in some third-world countries.23
Always a culture of extremes, Russia is the highest
uncertainty avoiding culture with a score of 95, which
helps to explain how the imperial and communist
regimes were able to maintain control of the population for so long with coercive yet predicable policies,
and through an ideological fervor that equated the
tsar with God and tied the Party to every individual.
Pakistan is the next intolerant of uncertainty at 70,
which helps explain the lean toward the traditional
practice of Islam and the development of deep
pockets of religious extremism.
Nigeria and the United States are rather moderate
at 55 and 46 respectively; this suggests a greater openness to innovation and a lower need for lots of rules.
To this end, a Nigerian doctor living and working in
the United States recently commented to the author:
“Lagos is total chaos. Things have gotten a lot better in
the past decade but those people have lived with chaos forever, they don’t know how to function without
it.”24 Despite its collectivist preference for harmony,
Chinese culture has a high tolerance for uncertainty.
This is likely influenced by the Confucian worldview
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that suggests the world and its history operate on a
system of recurring cycles that cannot be controlled
but are also generally predictable.
Although the Western press is rife with examples
of the horror and disruption caused by the march of
ISIL across the Levant, rather than only destroying cities in its path, in some cases it has become an almost
welcome AGS. Fareed Zakaria reported that in Mosul
(a city in Iraq with a score of 85 for uncertainty avoidance), ISIL actually provides a level of security that
has been absent in Iraq since the U.S. invasion, even
with ISIL-branded police cars and officers issuing traffic tickets. Mosul residents told journalist Todenhöfer
that under Iraq’s Shiite government they suffered
from the chaos and are now better off under ISIL.
Todenhöfer noted, “instead of anarchy they have now
law and order. And people don’t like [ISIL] but they
like their security. So they take taxes. They take care
of the poor.”25 In the same segment, Zakaria opined,
“while there is an allure to security in the abstract, no
one likes living under a brutal theocracy.” This juxtaposition of perception and fact is the key to determining whether and how to counter or co-opt AGS.26
Unfortunately, Hofstede’s model is only a starting point for this type of cultural analysis, because it
was last updated in 2010, thereby extending his original research conducted between 1967 and 1973 with
a too-small sample of participants from 76 countries.
Updating his results and weighting the key cultural
dimensions outlined here, however, would result in
scores that could determine which select cultures are
more or less susceptible to the development of viable
AGS that could threaten the sovereignty of the state.
Using the current data and weighting all three attributes equally, as noted in Table 1, Russia has the
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high score of 94, and in 1917, an alternative governance model developed by Vladimir Lenin did topple
the existing state and create a new governing architecture for the entire Russian Empire.
Countries

United States

Russia

Pakistan

Nigeria

Power Distance

40

93

55

80

Individualism

91

93

14

30

Uncertainty Avoidance

46

95

70

55

Average Score on 3 Dimensions

59

95

46

55

Table 1. Comparison of Select Dimensions
of National Culture.
The remaining cultures are moderates, but the argument can be made that the next high scorer is the
United States. Although U.S. sovereignty and stability
are believed to be secure, there are thousands of AGS
that co-opt the state’s monopoly on power; and yet
they exist without interference from and often working with the blessing of the state. These include trade
unions, civil society organizations, and even Amish
or closed Mormon communities, all of whom provide
services to their constituents, often persuade their
members how to participate (or not) in the political
process, and do not contribute to the public purse.
Nigeria is the next high scorer at 55, although
moderately so. From 1966, Nigeria experienced a series of coups d’état by various uncoordinated military
leaders; but this is in no way similar to the complete
societal change wrought by the Communist Party in
Russia, which had erected its own governance structures underground during the empire period. These
coups were a manifestation of the weakness of state
institutions, which can still describe much of the
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Nigerian government today, making it too politically weak to effectively manage any AGS that may
emerge. This series of military coups could suggest
that Nigeria’s military itself was an AGS, only ostensibly under state control; however, the vicious and violent competition for the top position in the Nigerian
government indicated personal ambition and sectoral
infighting within the military, prohibiting any form of
governance that might have become a viable alternative to a Westphalian state model.
The lowest scorer, Pakistan (46) is again at the median, which does not provide a clear indication of the
cultural threshold for any developing AGS that could
threaten state control. Pakistan’s score is mainly a
combination of very low levels of individualism and
tolerance for uncertainty, which suggest that existing
tribal and family structures, along with strong religious beliefs and Muslim or local mores, already govern individual Pakistanis more than does the central
government. In that case, AGS emerging in Karachi—
aided by the forces of urbanization and modernity that
draw those in megacities to seek structures to provide
the safety of a collective and enhance certainty—are
likely to lend themselves to a cultural disposition to
being governed locally by a trusted AGS, but disregard the central government. Pakistan’s mountainous geography already drives a cultural apathy to the
central government in preference to regional interests;
much like the U.S. Federal structure, which gives significant power to individual states and shared regional
interests.
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WHY FOCUS ON MEGACITIES?
Recent U.S. Chair of the Joint Chiefs General Raymond Odierno explained the importance of studying
megacities in his introduction to his Strategic Studies
Group’s 2014 report, Megacities and the United States
Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future, by
stating:
increasing urbanization throughout the world is making the megacity one of the key features of many potential operational theaters . . . most of the world’s
population will be in urban areas . . . a problem that
we must begin to understand and for which we must
prepare.27

General Odierno also pointed out that: “our Army
has experience throughout its history of operating in
urban environments. . . . [w]e have not, however, operated in urban areas with populations over 10 million people.”28 In addition, the report notes that missions are centered around actions to influence people,
which perfectly aligns with the idea of understanding
the governance structures that are operating or evolving within megacities to a degree that we can identify
non-military influence opportunities.
General Odierno’s own team asks rhetorically and
responds:
Why would the U.S. Army go to one of these places?
. . . [u]nderlying that question is an understanding that
current Army doctrine and historic military judgment
advocates avoiding urban areas in general for reasons
of practicality and risk.29

Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen argues
that violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) will increasingly
focus on the urban environments of the world’s emerg24

ing megacities, and the Naval War College’s Richard
J. Norton warns that “feral” cities provide breeding
grounds for criminal and terrorist networks. In response, the Department of Defense (DoD) has turned
to developing doctrine and operations appropriate to
these spaces. Central governments have limited presence and control in places “as varied as” Pakistan’s
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, northern Yemen, and the slum areas of megacities such as Rio de
Janeiro and Karachi.30
It is easy to focus on VNSAs when considering
alternative governance in megacities as we typically
hear more about groups that are expanding influence
through violence with states’ inability to halt their
progress, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria or ISIL. In
addition to ideological violent groups, there are also
intra- and interstate criminal networks, such as drug
cartels in Latin and South America and other trafficking groups as well as violent gangs, whose influence
is checked by the “turf” they control within a single
section of a city.
While there is interrelation between AGS and
VNSAs, there is a critical distinction between the
study of each. Though the VNSAs may be the individuals or groups who establish and maintain AGS, not
all nonstate actors, especially VNSAs, actually govern. In fact, many insurgent or terrorist groups, such
as al-Qaeda in Sudan or Somalia, may only be based
in a given territory and operate entirely separate of it,
focused on their own targets located elsewhere.
While examining AGS types, not all have a violent or profit-seeking structure. There are also civil
society and faith-based organizations providing services that are the traditional responsibility of states,
which can also (wittingly or otherwise) undermine
its authority peacefully. This is why it is important to
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focus on the structures that emerge, as opposed to the
individual groups themselves, to enable identification
of the varying types of alternative governance arising
in these immense urban areas before conflict or other
circumstances erupt that the United States considers
to be against its national interest.
Effects of Mega-Urbanization on Governance.
The movement of the world’s population from
increasingly rural to urban is well documented, and
branches of study of the force and consequences of
urbanization emerge almost daily on diverse topics
in many disciplines, from environmental sustainability to infrastructure development and resource
allocation.
The subject of governance develops as “megacities”
emerge, and concern rises over alternatives to sovereign national units that engender localized allegiances
or affiliations that become stronger than the national
identity. Imagine if the U.S. Federal or even New York
state structures failed so utterly to provide rescue,
remediation, rebuilding, security, infrastructure, and
basic services that 15 years later, by 2016, inhabitants
of the megacity that is the American commercial center began operating as if they were New Yorkers first
and no longer identified themselves as Americans.
What would be the specific failures of state structures
at all levels that might cause that outcome?
“Wild Forces,” Transition and Instability.
Pinker describes a number of forces he terms
“wild” that result in societies becoming more violent
and unstable,31 whereby they contribute to the creation

26

of Williams’ “dangerous spaces” where AGS are likely
to emerge.32 These include rootless or idle young men,
and tribal and traditional cultures based on honor, not
reason and empathy, as well as a reliance on self-help
justice or a law-on-the-street honor code. Pinker adds
that every human society is faced with a conflict of interest between the younger men who seek dominance
(and ultimately mating opportunities) for themselves,
and the older men who seek to minimize internecine
damage within their extended families and clans.33
This phenomenon is beginning to become significant in China with the prevalence of single young men
as a result of the One Child policy, which has created
a severe gender gap; single young men without the
civilizing influence of wives and children are likely to
pose an increasing threat to the state in both rural and
urban areas.
Traditional societies, such as the Igbo of Nigeria,
have developed the age-mate system in which young
people born in the same year are encouraged to form
a supporting clique, solving disputes and assisting
one another throughout their lives. Age-mate groups
pride themselves on activities that enhance village
life or build economic opportunity for the entire community, which engenders pride within each group
that can prevent young male members from creating
havoc. Movement away from these groups into larger
city environments is one of the trends that can remove
their desire to follow village mores; this, coupled with
decreased economic opportunity, can prevent them
from becoming good marriage candidates, and groups
of such young men joining together can increase violence and instability.
As was noted in the section on dimensions of national culture, there are other cultural attributes that
arise from traditional necessity, such as membership
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in a culture of honor often resulting in traditional
herding communities, for instance, that can be a predictor of violence and instability within society. A
prime example of this is the Hatfields and McCoys,
Scottish families that settled in the mountainous area
of West Virginia and Kentucky in the United States.
Their famous feud was fueled by this culture
of honor common among peoples living in hilly or
mountainous regions with little arable land for cultivation but well-suited for animal husbandry. If your
source of wealth and status is able to wander off or
be stolen, unlike something immovable such as land,
you must be prepared to guard it without question. In
such cultures, having a hair trigger temperament and
flaring the threat of violence at any perceived slight
is critical to maintaining a reputation of not being the
herder to be trifled with.
Hilly or mountainous terrain also lends itself to
AGS creation as such areas naturally develop independent, self-reliant communities in the “hollers” or
valley areas with natural defense lines. This terrain
leads to a decreased reliance upon and increased mistrust of any centralized government, especially if it
means cooperating with long-time enemies in the adjoining valley with whom you have traditionally vied
for resources. This is a critical issue in mountainous
regions like Pakistan.
Self-help or street justice is for alienated people,
whom Pinker calls “stateless,” even if they are full citizens of the state in which they reside. Due to their minority status, no matter what proportion of the population they comprise, their class, race, and economic
status causes them to be less or totally unprotected by
the legal code that applies to the rest of the citizenry.
The effectiveness of both a “legitimate” justice system
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and street justice are dependent upon credibility. This
form of justice outside the state is a notable attribute
of the code of honor described above.
Another factor affecting the loss of traditional mores that affects people moving into cities for the first
time is modernity itself. This can erode traditional
values centered around the family, tribe, religion,
and shared traditions, which, once individuals are removed from the cradle of these forces, can be gradually replaced by “individualism, cosmopolitanism, reason and science,” Pinker relates.34 These transitional
periods for individuals, communities, and states are
likely to be when violence is most prevalent as social
forces are realigned.
Measuring Governance in Megacities.
In looking at trends in urbanization, the focus is on
governance and the factors directly related to it from
the average citizen’s perspective; in its most basic
form, this includes providing economic opportunity,
security, and other basic services.
To this end, a number of existing indices can be
applied to provide a picture of megacities of increasing importance to U.S. defense planning. A basic application here includes: Lagos, Nigeria, because it
is the commercial capital and the port city through
which the United States imported $11.6 billion in oil
in 2013;35 and Karachi, Pakistan, due to its location at
the crossroad of India and China and its state’s contemporary contribution to instability in Central Asia.
These are compared to two cities in two very different
developed countries to identify what non-economic
factors contribute to the development of alternative
governance: New York City in the United States, and
Moscow in the Russian Federation.
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These measures, along with cultural dimensions
and basic demographic, political, and economic data,
added to critical field-based human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, can provide a set of very basic indicators for piecing together the contextual environment
in which the selected megacities exist as well as their
own prosperity and growth projections. Such an expandable toolbox is intended for U.S. Army planners
to provide merely a starting point for developing critical pre-knowledge of these locales and what is governing them. These indices or their sub-elements and
many other data sources, including pre-positioned
reliable HUMINT collectors, must be combined and
tested to determine what are the key conditions of life
and how they are set and manipulated within megacities and their states to develop an early measure of
alternative governance vulnerability, and to develop a
lens to identify which should be eliminated and which
have prospects for enhancing U.S. interests, before or
during times of conflict.
The Corruption Perceptions Index36 produced
annually by Transparency International is a familiar
governance indicator that shows how much citizens
trust their leaders to operate ethically; such trust is
crucial to maintaining popular support of the state as
a primary governing body. Its results for 2015 indicate
that, while improving, the other three cases exhibit
very high levels of corruption compared to the United
States, as shown in Figure 2.

30

Figure 2. Corruption Perceptions Index
Comparison, 2000-2014.
The Fragile States Index, until 2013 called the
“Failed States Index,” produced by the U.S. Institute
for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine since 2005, has
become a ubiquitous and valuable measure that can
be easily deconstructed and its sub-elements applied
to myriad challenges.37 Those most likely to be relevant to the study of the rise of AGS include at least the
following and can be carefully weighted to determine
how each contributes to the emergence of AGS. They
are described as such by the Fragile States Index:
• Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance—When
tension and violence exists between groups, the
state’s ability to provide security is undermined
and fear and further violence may ensue.
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• Legitimacy of the State—Corruption and a lack
of representativeness in the government directly undermines the social contract.
• Progressive Deterioration of State Services—
The provision of health, education, and sanitation services, among others, are key roles of the
state.
• Violation of Human Rights and Rule of Law—
When human rights are violated or unevenly
protected, the state is failing in its ultimate
responsibility.
• Security Apparatus—The security apparatus
should have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force. The social contract is weakened
where this is affected by competing groups.
• Rise of Factionalized Elites—When local and
national leaders engage in deadlock and brinksmanship for political gain, this undermines the
social contract.
The Prosperity Index is an annual ranking of 142
countries by the Legatum Institute, a London-based
policy think tank and educational charity focused on
promoting prosperity; its index is based on measurements of both income and well-being, defined by factors indicating wealth, economic growth, and quality
of life. The most relevant of five sub-indicators to this
study are prosperity, governance, safety, and security.
As these factors are quantified using a combination of
statistical indicators and qualitative information such
as surveys, they take into account both economic and
scientific elements as well as the perspectives of the
people living within the given conditions. Figure 3 indicates lower levels of safety and security than governance in Nigeria and Pakistan, suggesting those states
may have little time to enhance security provisions
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before they lose the remaining trust in the current
government.

Figure 3. Legatum Prosperity Index Selected
Factors, 2014.
The key study related to cities is the Cities Prosperity Index developed by the UN Habitat Program,
which aggregates five factors: productivity, quality
of life, infrastructure development, environmental
sustainability, and equity and social inclusion for an
overall prosperity score with 0.900 and above indicating cities with very solid prosperity factors. The latest
data available is from 2012-13, and the scores for that
period, unfortunately, do not include Karachi. This
source also provides growth projections valuable for
projecting social change, as displayed in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Rate of Urbanization Projected
Through 2020.
MEGACITY CASES: KARACHI AND LAGOS
Karachi, Pakistan.
Karachi is Pakistan’s only metropolitan city,38 and
is broken down into five regions. Karachi is home to
more than 23.5 million people, covers 3,500 square
kilometers, and has the highest literacy rates in the
country, up to 90 percent in the city center.39
Corruption and violence have become hallmarks of
Karachi’s reputation. The Pakistan National Accountability Bureau has begun addressing corruption by
prosecuting “mega corruption” cases against national
political figures, while rampant corruption remains at
lower-levels in government departments and public
offices.40
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Armed groups often use violence in Karachi as a
negotiating tactic to sway provincial and federal decision-making, which can threaten the viability of the
ruling coalition government. The armed wings of the
major political parties, including Muttahida Quami
Movement (MQM), Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP),
and Awami National Party (ANP), are the main perpetrators of urban violence. The political parties and
their armed wings clash over city resources and funds
generated through extortion. Karachi’s ethno-political
violence is based on the conflict between Urdu-speaking mohajirs (migrants) of the MQM against Pashtuns
represented by the ANP.41 The border between the mohajirs and Pashtun areas is a likely area to host ethnically based AGS emergence under this militia activity.
Violence overall has increased significantly in Karachi since 2003. Called Karachi’s “bloodiest year,”
2013 saw 2,700 murders.42 This high level of crime in
Karachi is not a simple phenomenon. Massive unregistered arms markets coupled with poverty and inequality have driven ethnic, political, and economic
feuds to increasing violence.43
Karachi exemplifies a city wrought by proxy warfare in what has been called the “New Great Game,”
characterized by an intricate web of alliances and
groups at the global, regional, and local levels that result in this spike in the murder rate. The lack of effective policing, mainly due to corruption and preferential police hiring of certain ethnic groups over others,
has led to the creation of many small militias, which
either protect a given group or target another.44
Since its official ouster from Afghanistan, the
Taliban has been steadily expanding its presence in
Karachi. Known domestically as Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP), the TTP has focused on attacking city
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police. Militants have gunned down police officers,
assaulted police stations, and sent suicide bombers to
assassinate top police commanders.45
Militants of many groups, including TTP, control
parts of Karachi, including Sohrab Goth, Manghopir,
and Ittehad Town. Over the years, TTP has made increasingly violent attacks, including one on the Sohrab
Goth police station on January 29, 2013. Station House
Officer Ashfaq Baloch of the Manghopir police station
stated that it is difficult to impose the law in his jurisdiction and that standard operating procedures followed by law enforcement elsewhere in the city have
to be modified. For instance, elsewhere in Karachi, a
single officer usually responds to the scene of a killing.
However, in Manghopir, law enforcement often waits
for bodies to turn up in the hospitals because it is too
dangerous to go to the crime scene.46
Karachi law enforcement has devised a map of
situational no-go areas due to ethnic violence and the
presence of militants and gangsters, which Karachi
law enforcement does not enter under any circumstances;47 only the paramilitary Pakistan Rangers serve
as these sectors’ security presence.48 Other areas on
the map are no-go areas only for a particular ethnicity
in times of ethnic violence.49 Municipal law enforcement does maintain a presence in less tense areas.50
The prevalence of violence in ethnically segregated
neighborhoods has made Karachi one of the places in
Pakistan that is most susceptible to army intervention.
In 2011, ethno-political violence led to Karachi’s business, trade, and industrial communities repeatedly
calling for the army to declare a state of emergency
and take control of security. Instead of intervening,
the military pressured politicians to negotiate with
militants.51
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Karachi’s uncontrolled urban sprawl also poses a
significant security problem. The developments taking place in peripheral areas of the city are beyond the
management capability of the government. Katchi abadis, or shantytowns, contain half of Karachi’s population. These cramped slums have inadequate services;
including sewage, water, and electricity, in addition to
a lack of security.52 The Karachi government’s lenient
policy towards housing regulation contributes to migration to the city from other parts of the country,53
which further reduces governance capability and increases the outskirts of Karachi susceptible to the formation of an AGS.
Karachi’s security situation has serious implications for U.S.-Pakistan relations because the megacity
has emerged as a hub of militancy and terrorist attacks. The fundraising and recruitment of the TTP is a
major element of the terrorist presence in Karachi, and
as these groups consolidate power in the city, they
could increase the current perception of Pakistan’s
ambivalence about fighting terrorism within its territory, further straining relations with the United States
and encouraging intervention in the future.54
High-level interventions by the Pakistan Army
and Supreme Court have helped to temporarily disrupt cycles of violence in Karachi. On March 11, 2015,
Rangers raided the headquarters of the MQM party
in Karachi, arresting 20 party members, seizing illegal weapons, and closing down the office. The United States and Amnesty International have accused
the MQM and breakaway factions of human rights
abuses, including torture and summary killings.55
However, interventions such as the raid on MQM
headquarters do not offer sustainable long-term solutions to Karachi’s violent politics.
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Lagos, Nigeria.
Although the United States imports 70 percent
less oil from Nigeria than it did in 2003, in 2013, Nigeria still provided 3 percent of U.S. oil imports. That
oil flows through Lagos, the commercial capital and
deep-water port on the Gulf of Guinea. In addition to
the port and its facilities, Lagos has a diverse economy
with manufacturing and service industries, banking,
telecommunications, and some more traditional activities including mining, agriculture, forestry, and
fishing. It returns about 30 percent of Nigeria’s gross
domestic product and serves as the primary hub for
international trade.56
Founded in 1472, Lagos was named by Portuguese
explorers for its many lagoons, which cause a significant amount of its land area to be unsuitable for
building or other infrastructure. In 1986, severe traffic
congestion led to the relocation of Nigeria’s political
capital from Lagos to Abuja. Lagos’ geography, while
a source of valuable resources and infrastructure, is
also one of its most problematic features, much like
New York City. The DoD’s Megacities Report profiled
Lagos as:
a loosely integrated megacity . . . composed of continuous urban sprawl primarily made up of buildings
and informal structures of 1-3 stories, the majority of
which are connected by informal dirt roads and large
swaths of slums and shanties that are alternately governed. . . . Most of the slums float in the Lagos lagoon,
and consist of shacks built to no construction standard.
Yet, they have a school system, medical facilities, and
even cell towers. Alternatively governed spaces will
be more common in developing megacities in the
future.57
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Lagos officially became a megacity in 2010 and
is one of the most densely populated cities in Africa.
The population is estimated at 21 million, and it is the
most populous metropolitan area in Nigeria as well
as the second most populous and fastest-growing city
in Africa after Cairo. Lagos currently ranks as the seventh fastest-growing city in the world, with 25 percent
of all Africans being Nigerian.58
Since Nigeria returned to civilian leadership after
civil war and multiple coups in 1999, the perception
of corruption has declined steadily; however, due to
increasing violence by the Boko Haram radical Islamic
group and the response by the Nigerian Joint Task
Force that frequently includes brutality against civilians, as well as ongoing environmental degradation
and economic inequality, since the Fund for Peace
began measuring state fragility in 2005, Nigeria has
declined from 84.3 to 102.4, compared to the U.S. score
for 2015 at 35.3.59
A series of reforms began in Nigeria in 1999 aimed
at reducing inequality and increasing citizen participation in government at all levels. In Lagos, most citizens credit current Mayor Babatunde Fashola, often
referred to as the “Mayor Bloomberg of Lagos State,”
for his high achievement in this area. Less visible signs
of local government reform include improved basic
service provision and physical infrastructure.
In June 2015, the World Bank’s International Development Association granted a $200 million credit
directly to the Lagos district government. These funds
were intended to improve public finances to help maintain the state’s recent economic growth and poverty
reduction efforts and assist in continuing to provide
social services. The World Bank noted that, “In the past
decade Lagos State achieved significant economic
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growth, improved its infrastructure and services,
significantly reduced crime, and brought millions of
people out of poverty.”60
Lagos State Government has also identified local
stakeholder groups outside the elites with whom to
implement more inclusive decision-making methods
for economic and infrastructure development and
planning. These include town hall meetings with local government officials to which groups from various districts are invited to participate, including market stallholders, landlords, community development
representatives, and religious and traditional leaders.
They are encouraged to openly and collaboratively
discuss draft legislation and development plans before they are approved or implemented. Professor
Michael Filani reports that:
Traditional rulers serve as spokespersons for the community on issues such as granting lockup permits and
tenement rates, and they are usually consulted to obtain their endorsement of other important issues. . . .
[p]ublic expenditure by the local government is monitored by a statutory committee.61

Community groups are represented by both genders
and even youths.
While positive strides have been made, Lagos’
population density and the various islands that comprise it inherently create opportunities for subdivision easily subjected to alternative governance where
the population is least served by the state and has
the least economic opportunity or political power.
As Nigeria is critical to maintaining stability in West
Africa, and as Islamic terrorism continues to ravage
the northern part of the country mainly in the form of
Boko Haram, and as China’s interest in Nigeria and its
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resources and logistical benefits increases, the country
as a whole is of primary interest to U.S. military planners, with Lagos to become increasingly important in
strategic thinking.
In northern Nigeria, recent violence has been perpetrated mainly by the Islamic militants Boko Haram
and their offshoots. In the south, aside from criminal
acts, violence is politically driven, not religious, and
targets the wealth derived from the oil industry at the
expense of the environment and lack of economic opportunity for those who live in the oil-rich areas. Although a peace was negotiated in 2009, some former
associates of the violent Movement for the Emancipation for the Niger Delta (MEND) have resumed activities that include oil pipeline sabotage, kidnapping,
and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, as they do not feel
the government has kept its side of the peace agreement by providing jobs and training opportunities for
former MEND members.
Other types of political violence include the sort
of post-election skirmishes that took place in northern Nigeria in April 2015. In Lagos, civil disturbance
is often organized by local politicians who mobilize
“Area Boys (and Girls)” for this purpose. Such activities do not constitute alternative governance, as these
are isolated political activities and not structures controlling geographic areas. While the Nigerian Police
Force (NPF) appears to be ubiquitous in urban areas,
visiting U.S. officials are frequently asked to assist in
the provision of community policing and law enforcement training, communications equipment, and vehicles to the NPF and local forces. This lack of resources,
leadership, and training has led most Nigerians to
doubt the NPF’s effectiveness, to the extent that criminals operate with impunity, aside from local vigilante
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groups that occasionally capture perpetrators and kill
them on the spot.62
In June 2013, the Lagos City Council announced
that it had recruited 50 vigilantes to provide security
from criminals who had been kidnapping and robbing
local citizens, adding that the Council was so confident in this approach that it would be hiring even
more for this purpose.63 In January 2015, traditional
leader Chief Moshood Balogun of Lagos’ Idimuland
announced a community-policing program in his
area, which had local residents serving in a surveillance capacity combined with a vigilante group assisting the federal government. The program also calls for
the purchase of new telecommunications equipment
to help prevent incidents of sabotage and theft on the
community’s oil pipeline segments.64
Like the Smotra group in Moscow, as long as the
vigilantes remain attuned to the specific tasks they
have been mandated to conduct by the local authorities, this “community policing” might not burgeon
into alternative governance; but a traditional chief
employing local vigilantes to protect residents could
also signal the opening salvo of the development of
someplace like Idimuland as a separate geographical
and political enclave moving further away from the
host megacity and state. Monitoring such events is a
significant task, but early warning will be the key to
mission success in case of active missions to protect
U.S. interests, such as maintaining an uninterrupted
flow of Nigerian oil.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The subject of identifying the emergence of AGS
and determining if they present a threat or opportu-
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nity to U.S. Army planners mirrors the enormity and
complexity of megacities themselves, which would
be impossible to treat comprehensively in this space.
Directions for further breaking down the topic and
addressing its critical aspects for additional study are
the primary policy recommendations arising from this
monograph.
Develop a Robust Alternative Governance
Vulnerability Index.
As noted in the sections on dimensions of culture
and measuring alternative governance, the metrics
presented here are only a starting point for developing
a predictive model that can be effectively tested and
expanded to identify a fuller alternative governance
vulnerability index. The metrics suggested here must
be enhanced and combined with additional and varied information sources, including reliable HUMINT
collection as expanded below. Then, each must be rigorously tested for validity and carefully weighted and
applied to robust case studies augmented with field
research. In this way, the Army can create a valuable
indicator and warning model to identify the true social, political, and economic centers of gravity within
megacities and their populations; detect any early
shifts in these centers; determine the appropriate responses or monitoring; and finally define appropriate
measures of mission success long before any considerations of force commitments are made. As Keister
noted, “The challenges of seeing into such spaces
also make it difficult to assign blame or locate and
target those at fault in the event of undesirable outcomes—limiting America’s ability to deter threatening
activities.”65
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Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
While the U.S. Army has always been good at
geographic terrain analysis—augmented only in
the past few decades by highly attuned reconnaissance tools such as aerial photography, satellites, and
drones—these technological tools are of limited use in
densely populated megacities with varying structural
challenges. This makes the development of reliable
HUMINT critical to developing solid indicators and
warnings to trigger appropriate missions and define
their success parameters.
In addition to HUMINT collection to identify power shifts, much like the effective use of native scouts in
the Army’s support of westward expansion, the use
of local sources should be used to identify physical
“turf” boundaries of emergent or nascent AGS and the
degree of border solidity.
Finally, urban terrain analysis should be applied to
megacities to determine whether natural or manmade
geographic features inherently create boundaries
between AGS. Identify whether the city layout, past
and likely future growth patterns, or the natural terrain upon which it is located will inherently lend itself
to alternative governance, or will it unless projected
growth directions or controls are reconsidered.
Recognize the Growing Power of the Megacity
Vis-à-Vis Surrounding States.
As megacities grow and states lose the ability to
control them for various reasons, our view on their
significance must increase as well. This was well noted in Richard Lamb’s 2008 DoD study on ungoverned
spaces and safe havens:
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In many cases, provincial, local, tribal, or autonomous
governments—and in some cases, other countries,
corporations, or organizations—are simply better positioned than the central government to address the
local conditions that enable illicit actors to operate
there.66

Army intelligence elements could assist in the development of a robust HUMINT capability in megacities to begin clearly identifying the recruitment targets
and understanding their social isolation or frustration
with their current environment in order to infiltrate
or partner with existing members of an AGS before
conflicts require direct engagement. In the case of
states that are failing to provide essential security
and other services, the national military organizations
and federal police are likely to be too well aware of
the shortcomings, and members participating in U.S.
military partnership activities such as joint training
or the International Military Education and Training
program, as well as National Guard pairings, are good
starting points for developing effective indicator and
warning information sources.
Identify and Enhance the Strength of “Civilizing
Forces” within Megacities.
Across cultures and history, it is commonly women, religious leaders, and elders that exert the most
influence in measures that reduce violence and enhance governance. Identifying centers of power under
such leadership could be a signal of an AGS, active
or nascent, with which the United States might align
for enhanced governance across the megacity or state.
This cooperation would be through “smart power”
offensives, for which Army Civil Affairs might again
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partner with National Guard or State Department Foreign Affairs Officers for insights, as well as regional
HUMINT experts.
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